Resurrecting the Faith-Based Plan: Analyzing Government Funding for Religious Social Service Groups by Storino, Daniel K.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 79 | Issue 1 Article 8
12-1-2003
Resurrecting the Faith-Based Plan: Analyzing
Government Funding for Religious Social Service
Groups
Daniel K. Storino
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel K. Storino, Resurrecting the Faith-Based Plan: Analyzing Government Funding for Religious Social Service Groups, 79 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 389 (2003).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol79/iss1/8
RESURRECTING THE FAITH-BASED PLAN:
ANALYZING GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR
RELIGIOUS SOCIAL SERVICE GROUPS
Daniel K Storino*
INTRODUCTION
Throughout his presidency, George W. Bush has vowed to help
faith-based organizations compete for federal funds.1 In early 2001,
President Bush committed his administration to a faith-based plan
that would improve government funding for religious groups that pro-
vide secular social services, such as "curbing crime, conquering addic-
tion, strengthening families and neighborhoods, and overcoming
poverty."2 The President promised that the plan would be "one of the
most important initiatives that [his] administration not only discusses,
but implements. '3 President Bush has argued that in the past, faith-
based organizations have been "discriminat[ed] against" when seek-
ing federal funds. 4 Through faith-based initiatives, the Bush adminis-
tration hopes to increase the efforts of charitable organizations by
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2004; B.A., American
Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2001. I would like to thank Professors Mark
Kende and Richard Garnett for their invaluable comments and suggestions, and the
members of the Notre Dane Law Review for their hard work on this Note. I would also
like to thank Professor A.J. Bellia for his guidance throughout law school. Finally, I
would like to thank my parents, Donald and Patricia, and my three brothers, Donald,
John, and Timothy, for their constant love and support.
1 Shortly after taking office, President Bush announced his intention to help
faith-based organizations. See Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499, 8499 (Jan.
29, 2001) (establishing the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initia-
tives (OFBCI) in order "to enlist, equip, enable, empower, and expand the work of
faith-based" groups). In 2003, President Bush "continu[ed] to urge Congress" to help
faith-based groups receive federal funds. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Passes Version of
Religion Initiative, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 10, 2003, at A24.
2 Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. at 8499.
3 Remarks on Signing Executive Orders with Respect to Faith-Based and Com-
munity Initiatives, 1 PUB. PAPERS 26, 26 (2001).
4 Jennifer Loven, Bush Helps Religious Groups Get Contracts, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec.
13, 2002, at 5.
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permitting religious groups to receive federal funds on an equal basis
as secular social service providers. The plan permits such funding
while allowing the faith-based groups to maintain their religious char-
acter and identity. The faith-based plan does not intend to favor relig-
ious organizations; rather, it simply seeks to have faith-based and
secular social service groups "compete on a level playing field" for fed-
eral funds.
5
Under the faith-based plan, religious social service groups can re-
ceive federal aid in two ways. First, the government can indirectly
fund religious groups by issuing vouchers to needy individuals who
then decide where to direct the aid. 6 Here, the government aid indi-
rectly reaches religious institutions because the individual, not the gov-
ernment, decides where to spend the aid.7 Second, faith-based
programs can also receive federal funds in the form of direct grants to
help the organizations run their social services.8 Government funding
for religious social service groups has been criticized for blurring the
line between church and state and violating the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.9
Recent Establishment Clause case law, however, suggests the con-
stitutionality of voucher-style funding for religious institutions. In
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,10 the United States Supreme Court upheld
an Ohio school voucher program.11 Under the program, the state
provides needy families with vouchers, and the families privately de-
cide whether or not to use the aid on a religious school.1 2 According
to the Court, school voucher programs that comply with two main
conditions will not violate the Establishment Clause. First, the pro-
5 Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. at 8499.
6 Scott M. Michelman, Faith-Based Initiatives, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 475, 475
(2002).
7 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649-55 (2002) (describing school
vouchers as indirect aid because the government funds are first routed to individual
families).
8 Michelman, supra note 6, at 475.
9 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 6, at 475, 487-92 (explaining that the faith-
based plan has been "[c]riticized for weakening the separation between church and
state" and arguing that direct aid will be found unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court); Alexis Peters, Note and Comment, The Office of Faith-Based and Community Ini-
tiatives: Why the Establishment Clause Prevents Religious and Public Social Service Providers
from Competing on a "Level Playing Field, " 23 WHrfrIER L. REV. 1173, 1174, 1207-10
(2002) (arguing that the OFBCI violates the Establishment Clause because it provides
direct federal aid).
10 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
11 Id. at 662-63.
12 Id. at 645-46.
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gram must be "neutral in all respects toward religion." 13 Second, it
must be a "program of true private choice."14 Although Zelman sug-
gests how the Court would treat voucher-style faith-based initiatives,
the constitutionality of directly funded religious groups is less clear
and more controversial.
Given the outcome in Zelman, the constitutionality of the faith-
based plan may similarly turn on whether it too needs to abide by the
Court's two benchmarks of neutrality and true private choice. Both
before and after the Zelman decision, some have suggested that the
Court would only uphold an indirectly funded faith-based program
that fulfills these conditions. 15 This Note will examine whether the
Court's analysis in Zelman and other relevant cases requires religious
social service groups to be indirectly funded by the government. In
Part I, the analysis centers on the origins and legislative history of the
faith-based plan, and demonstrates the similarities between school
vouchers and faith-based initiatives. Part II examines the Court's Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence, and determines where Zelman fits
into the Court's case law. Part III briefly .discusses the implications of
Zelman on religious institutions that receive indirect or voucher-style
funding. Part IV analyzes the more difficult issue of where Zelman and
other recent Supreme Court cases have left the future of directly
funded programs. This Part also examines how current Supreme
Court Justices would treat such programs. Ultimately, this Note
predicts that the current Court will narrowly uphold both directly and
indirectly funded faith-based initiatives.
I. THE ORIGINS AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FAITH-BASED PLAN
The likely impact of the school vouchers decision on the future
of faith-based initiatives can reasonably be anticipated because of the
strong similarities between the two. In fact, school aid cases like
Zelman have been referred to as the "closest analogy" to determining
13 Id. at 653.
14 Id.
15 See David G. Savage, New School of Thought: Vouchers Are Constitutional When Is-
sued to Individuals Instead of Religious Groups, 88 A.B.A. J. 34, 34 (2002) (arguing that
Zelman suggests faith-based initiatives are constitutional "so long as the money flows
through individuals, not directly to religious groups"); Elbert Lin et al., Developments
in Policy, Faith in the Courts? The Legal and Political Future of Federally-Funded Faith-Based
Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y Riv. 183, 204-05 (2002) (predicting before the Zelman
decision that "a faith-based social welfare program would need to provide secular op-
tions and route aid directly to individuals involved in the program, perhaps in the
form of vouchers," and suggesting that "block grants to religious institutions [are]
likely to garner the support of only four Justices").
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whether the faith-based plan would be found constitutional. 16 For in-
stance, the faith-based plan and school vouchers have similar origins
and objectives. School voucher laws provide low-income families with
a voucher, up to $2250 under the Ohio law, to use on either public or
private schools, regardless of their religion.1 7 In most programs,
vouchers are available to children located in school districts that the
state has determined are failing its students.18 If a family resides in
such a district, the vouchers are distributed to parents based on finan-
cial need.19 The parents then decide where to direct the tuition aid. 20
Since the families can use the vouchers for public or private schools,
these programs do not openly favor religious schools over secular
ones. 21 To ensure evenhandedness, the Ohio voucher law provides
tutorial aid for the children that wish to remain in the public
schools.
22
These voucher programs emerged as an attempt to bolster strug-
gling educational systems by offering low-income families additional
schooling options.23 In Zelman, the Court recognized that "Cleve-
land's public schools have been among the worst performing public
schools in the Nation." 24 The Court explained that "[o]nly 1 in 10
ninth graders could pass a basic proficiency examination" and
"[m]ore than two-thirds of high school students either dropped or
failed out before graduation." 25 Hence, school voucher laws were
passed to improve educational opportunities. 26
The faith-based plan emerged from similar beginnings and with a
common purpose. Federal funding for religious social service groups
16 Lin et al., supra note 15, at 200.
17 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645-46.
18 The Ohio voucher law applied to school districts that "are or have ever been
under federal court order requiring supervision and operational management of the
district by the state superintendent." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(A) (Anderson
2002).
19 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645-46.
20 Id. at 645.
21 See id. at 653-54.
22 Id. at 645.
23 Id. at 643-47.
24 Id. at 644.
25 Id.
26 Other voucher programs emerged under comparable conditions. The Florida
Opportunity Scholarship Program was passed in response to a deficient public educa-
tion system. In Florida, the graduation rates were "one of the worst in the nation, at
just below sixty percent." Suzanne Hansen, School Vouchers: The Answer to a Failing
Public School System, 23 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 73, 86 (2001).
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is not unique to the Bush administration. 27 The President himself has
recognized that "America has a long tradition of accommodating and
encouraging religious institutions when they pursue public goals."
28
The federal government has funded orphanages and hospitals that
have religious identities, and Lyndon Johnson's Great Society funded
faith-based organizations such as the Salvation Army and Catholic
Charities.29 The President has promoted the recent resurgence of
funding for religious organizations in an attempt to combat problems
that continue to frustrate the American people. In early 2001, Presi-
dent Bush established the White House Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives (OFBCI) to help execute the faith-based
plan.30 In announcing the OFBCI, President Bush explained that
"there are still deep needs and real suffering in the shadow of
America's affluence" as problems like addiction, abandonment, "gang
violence, domestic violence, mental illness and homelessness" still
plague the country.
31
Faith-based and community programs can be effective tools in ad-
dressing these problems. Religious and community institutions are
"often well-situated to provide necessary social services in poverty-
stricken areas" because the institutions are "based in the community"
and have ties to the neighborhood. 32 In Freedom from Religion Founda-
tion, Inc. v. McCallum,3 3 the Seventh Circuit recognized that "[t]he
success of Alcoholics Anonymous is evidence that Christianity can be a
valuable element in a program treating addiction. '3 4 Even those that
challenge the constitutionality of the OFBCI have conceded that " [i] t
is virtually indisputable that faith-based organizations have had an ex-
emplary record of community service. '35
Ultimately, the faith-based plan and school vouchers were
founded for similar purposes: to increase the quality of services that
they respectively supply. Just as school vouchers arose as a response to
failing educational systems, President Bush's faith-based plan
emerged to respond to the nation's continuing struggle with addic-
27 David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment
Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 559, 560 (2002).
28 Commencement Address at the University of Notre Dame in Notre Dame, In-
diana, 1 PUB. PAPERS 551, 554 (2001).
29 Lin et al., supra note 15, at 186.
30 Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499, 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
31 Remarks on Signing Executive Orders with Respect to Faith-Based and Com-
munity Initiatives, supra note 3, at 26.
32 Cole, supra note 27, at 567.
33 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003).
34 Id. at 882.
35 Peters, supra note 9, at 1196.
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tion, poverty, and homelessness. Furthermore, the two respond to
their respective problems in the same manner. They provide low-in-
come families and the nation's needy with religious alternatives for
schooling and social services.
In addition, proponents of school vouchers and the faith-based
plan often face similar legal challenges and use similar legal argu-
ments to defend the constitutionality of their programs. As men-
tioned earlier, the most obvious objection to both school vouchers
and the faith-based plan is that they violate the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. In response, both programs emphasize that
as long as the aid is provided neutrally and is used to promote secular
purposes, such as education and social services, the funding will not
infringe upon the Constitution. As a result of these strong similarities,
the legal community has understandably predicted that the Zelman
decision reveals how the Supreme Court would view the constitution-
ality of the faith-based plan.
36
The initiative, however, has encountered some political setbacks.
The faith-based plan was initially a bipartisan project to improve the
overall capacities of charitable organizations. In fact, during the 2000
presidential campaign, Democratic nominee Al Gore promoted a sim-
ilar initiative. Unfortunately, the faith-based plan has become deeply
embedded in partisan politics. A spokesman for Senator Joseph Lie-
berman explained that "[i]nstead of working to build a common-
ground coalition, the White House allowed extremists in the House
[of Representatives] to hijack the faith-based initiative and pursue a
partisan, polarizing course.
'37
As a result of this partisan divide, the Bush administration has
struggled to push a bill called the Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empow-
erment Act (CARE) through Congress.3 8 The Bush administration
had originally intended to use the CARE bill to implement the faith-
based plan.3 9 In addition to encouraging charitable donations, the
36 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian
Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 993
(2003) (arguing that "Zelman virtually guarantees that vouchers will play a central role
in the ongoing debate over the role of faith-based organizations in government-fi-
nanced social service"); David G. Savage, Leap of Faith: Outcome of School Vouchers Case
Could Tell Fate of Bush's Faith-Based Initiatives, 88 A.B.A. J. 29, 29 (2002) (predicting
that the Court's treatment of school vouchers in Zelman will influence how the Court
regards the faith-based plan).
37 Dana Milbank, Bush Legislative Approach Failed in Faith Bill Battle: White House Is
Faulted for Not Building a Consensus in Congress, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2003, at A01.
38 See Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment Act, S. 1924, 107th Cong.
(2002); Stolberg, supra note 1, at A24.
39 Stolberg, supra note 1, at A24.
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CARE bill had a provision that provided "explicit protections for
groups with religious names or religious icons in their literature.
'" 40
This provision prohibited discrimination against religious groups and
was aimed at increasing the ability of such groups to vie for govern-
ment funding.41 In the spring of 2003, proponents of the faith-based
plan agreed to remove religious elements from the CARE bill in order
to ease its passage. 42 While the bill still included incentives to en-
courage charitable donations, the provision offering specific protec-
tion to religious groups was cut.4 3 This "watered-down" version of the
CARE bill was overwhelmingly passed in the Senate by a vote of ninety-
five to five. 44 On September 17, 2003, the House of Representatives
almost unanimously passed the Charitable Giving Act, an equivalent
to the weakened CARE bill.
45
Despite this legislative setback, the faith-based initiative is still
alive. Although the Bush administration struggled to pass legislative
measures, it has consistently used Executive Orders to implement ele-
ments of the faith-based plan. For instance, President Bush estab-
lished the OFBCI through Executive Order. 46 Also, after Congress
delayed passing elements of the faith-based plan, President Bush is-
sued another Executive Order in December 2002.47 This Order
banned discrimination against religious organizations and gave such
groups equal protection when seeking federal funds.48 The Bush ad-
ministration has suggested that it will continue to use Executive Or-
ders and other measures to implement the provisions that were cut
from the CARE bill. 49 Since the faith-based plan continues to be im-
plemented through government action, its constitutionality remains
subject to intense debate.
However, Congress's political decision to pass a "watered-down"
version of the CARE bill does not imply that the faith-based plan is






45 See Charitable Giving Act of 2003, H.R. 7, 108th Cong. (2003) (passing with
only thirteen representatives voting against it).
46 Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499, 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
47 Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec. 12, 2002).
48 Id. at 77,141-42.
49 Carl Hulse, With Tussles, House Renews ajob Program, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2003, at
A26; see also Editorial, The War at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003, § 4, at 8 (explaining
that "administration aides were assuring reporters that what went out in the legisla-
ture was being reinstated through executive order").
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recent Supreme Court cases, such as Zelman, to argue that the plan
would be found constitutional. Although the faith-based plan has
struggled politically, the Court's recent Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence may resurrect the initiative by demonstrating its
constitutionality.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
In order to fully understand the Court's ruling in Zelman and its
likely impact on the faith-based plan, this Note will first analyze how
the Court has developed its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The
First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."50 The Amendment has been interpreted in a variety of ways.
"Separationists" contend that the Amendment requires a "strict sepa-
ration" between the government's actions and any support of religious
activities. 5' Referring to the frequently quoted phrase in a Thomas
Jefferson letter, strict separationists call for a "wall of separation" be-
tween the government and religious groups. 5 2
On the other hand, the "accommodationist" view argues that the
Amendment does not require such a strict dividing line.5 3 This view
proposes that while the Amendment sought to prevent the establish-
ment of a national religion, it was not intended to preclude all interac-
tion between church and state. 54 According to the accommodationist
position, the essence of the Establishment Clause is to prevent the
government from "us [ing] its authority and resources to support one
religion over another, or religion over nonreligion. '" 55 Accommoda-
50 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51 See Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the First Amend-
ment, and Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 315 (2000) (mentioning the separa-
tionist position and other interpretations of the Establishment Clause).
52 Ashley M. Bell, Comment, "God Save This Honorable Court": How Current Estab-
lishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical Religious
Expressions, 50 Am. U. L. REv. 1273, 1281-82 (2001).
53 See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response
to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REx'. 685, 687-88 (1992) (arguing that "the principle of
accommodation" between government and religion "is consistent with the require-
ments of the Religion Clauses"); Peters, supra note 9, at 1179-80 (explaining the basic
elements of the accommodationist position).
54 See McConnell, supra note 53, at 688 (distinguishing between
"[a]ccommodations of religion" and "the establishment of religion").
55 Id.
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tionists argue that the First Amendment compels the government to
treat religious organizations neutrally.
56
The Court's treatment of the Establishment Clause has been in-
consistent over the years. This Part will analyze the changes that have
occurred. It will evaluate the Court's oft-criticized, three-prong test
from Lemon v. Kurtzman57 and the modifications to this test. This Part
will also analyze the Court's treatment of government aid to religious
social welfare groups and to religious schools.
A. The Early Cases: Moving from "a Wall of Separation"58 to "a
Blurred, Indistinct, and Variable Barrier"
59
One of the Court's earliest interpretations of the Establishment
Clause was in Everson v. Board of Education.60 In Everson, the Court
addressed a New Jersey law that reimbursed parents with children in
public and religious schools for the costs of bus transportation to their
schools. 61 Although the Court upheld the NewJersey law and permit-
ted an indirect benefit to flow to families in religious schools, the
Court strongly emphasized the importance of keeping church and
state separate. Justice Black's interpretation of the Clause revealed
the separationist view:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force
nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attend-
ance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
56 See, e.g., Vernadette Ramirez Broyles, The Faith-Based Initiative, Charitable Choice,
and Protecting the Free Speech Rights of Faith-Based Organizations, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'V 315, 336 (explaining that "[t]he Establishment Clause requires government to
be neutral-not hostile-toward religion and religious expression"); Carl H. Esbeck,
A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers,
46 EMORY L.J. 1, 20-41 (1997) (arguing for the neutrality principle, rather than the
separationist view, in government relations with religion).
57 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
58 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
59 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
60 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
61 Id. at 3.
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participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa. In the words ofJefferson, the clause against establish-
ment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation
between church and State."
62
The Court explained that the "wall [between church and state]
must be kept high and impregnable" and that it "could not approve
the slightest breach."63 Despite this separationist language, the
Court's decision ultimately demonstrated that the Establishment
Clause requires the government to treat religious groups neutrally:
"That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not re-
quire the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be
used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them."64 While the
Everson Court erected a "wall" between church and state, it also found
that neutral treatment of religious groups does not impregnate or
breach that wall.
The Everson decision adopted some separationist principles
mixed with a hint of the accommodationist theory. The Court, how--
ever, moved closer to an accommodationist interpretation of the Es-
tablishment Clause in several of its subsequent decisions. In Board of
Education v. Allen,65 the Court upheld a New York law that permitted
school districts to loan secular textbooks to all students, irrespective of
their enrollment at a religious or public school. 66 The Allen Court
recognized that while the law primarily benefited students and par-
ents, it also conferred a benefit on religious schools because it would
"make it more likely that some children choose to attend a sectarian
school."6 7 The Court suggested that some support of religious organi-
zations is constitutional, and it found that the benefit in this case did
not amount to "an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious
institution.
68
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court continued to move away from a
strict separationist view of the Establishment Clause. In fact, by Lemon
the Court had significantly distanced itself from the "wall" metaphor
that it adopted twenty-four years earlier in Everson.69 The Court now
admitted that "total separation [between church and state] is not pos-
62 Id. at 15-16.
63 Id. at 18.
64 Id.
65 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
66 Id. at 243, 248.
67 Id. at 243-44.
68 Id.
69 Peters, supra note 9, at 1180.
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sible in an absolute sense. '70 Rather, the Court explained that
"[s] ome relationship between government and religious organizations
is inevitable. '71 The Court even went so far as to state "that the line of
separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable
barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular
relationship."
72
Here, the Court also formalized the three-prong Lemon test that it
would struggle to apply in interpreting the Establishment Clause for
the next twenty-five years. In analyzing the constitutionality of aid to
religious groups, the Court officially identified the following three cri-
teria: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; sec-
ond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion."' 73 Although the Court re-
jected the strict "wall" imagery, it used this three-prong test to strike
down Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes.7 4 The Pennsylvania
statute reimbursed private schools for the costs of "teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects. '75
The Rhode Island statute permitted the state to directly pay "teachers
in nonpublic elementary schools a supplement of 15% of their annual
salary."' 76 Both statutes passed the Court's "purpose" test, as the Court
found that it would not question the statutes' stated intentions to im-
prove secular education in schools. 77 The Court, however, found that
both statutes, which mainly benefit nonpublic schools, foster an "ex-
cessive entanglement between government and religion."7 8 While the
aid programs were found unconstitutional, the Court's language
demonstrated that it would not interpret the Establishment Clause as
erecting an insurmountable "wall" between church and state.
70 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). The Court had previously applied these
three requirements in its Establishment Clause cases; however, it formalized the test
in Lemon. SeeJamie Steven Kilberg, Note, Neutral and Indirect Aid: Designing a Constitu-
tional School Voucher Program Under the Supreme Court's Accommodationist Jurisprudence, 88
GEO. L.J. 739, 746-47 (2000) (explaining that the Court's "purpose" and "effects"
prongs were applied in the Court's Allen decision, while the "excessive entanglement"
prong was first used in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970)).
74 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 607.
77 Id. at 613.
78 Id. at 613-14, 620-22.
2003]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Two years after Lemon, the Court again used its three-prong test
to strike down aid to religious schools in Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.79 Nyquist represents a critical case in
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence because opponents of
school vouchers often refer to it as evidence that vouchers are uncon-
stitutional. 80 The New York law that the Court struck down provided
direct money grants to nonpublic schools for maintenance and repair,
and it provided tuition reimbursements to parents with children in
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools.81 In applying the
Lemon test, the Court did not question the secular purpose of either
part of the statute. 82 However, it found that the law had the unconsti-
tutional effect of advancing religion by distinguishing between public
and nonpublic schools and only providing aid for the nonpublic
schools. 83 The Nyquist Court distinguished its decision from the laws
that it upheld in Everson and Allen by explaining that those laws in-
volved a "class of beneficiaries [that] included all schoolchildren,
those in public as well as those in private schools. '8 4 Consequently,
the unconstitutional aid in Nyquist can easily be distinguished from
the aid in school voucher programs and faith-based initiatives. Unlike
the funding for the faith-based plan, the aid in Nyquist was not distrib-
uted neutrally to public and nonpublic schools.
Another distinguishing feature in the Nyquist decision is that the
New York law did not include a secular content restriction for the
aid.85 A law with a secular content restriction specifically explains that
government funds may only be used for secular purposes. The Nyquist
Court recognized that "some forms of aid may be channeled to the
secular without providing direct aid to the sectarian. '86 The Court,
however, found that both the direct maintenance-and-repair grants8 7
and the tuition reimbursements88 failed to ensure that government
aid would be restricted to secular functions.
79 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
80 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 661-62 (2002) (challenging the
Ohio school voucher law, the state taxpayers argued that the Supreme Court should
rely on Nyquis, however, the Court distinguished between Ohio's constitutional
voucher program and the unconstitutional law at issue in Nyquist).
81 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 762-64.
82 Id. at 773.
83 Id. at 783.
84 Id. at 782 n.38.
85 Id. at 774, 782-83.
86 Id. at 775.
87 Id. at 774.
88 Id. at 782-83.
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These early Establishment Clause cases reveal that the Court is
willing to accept at least some interaction between government and
religion. While the Nyquist decision in many ways suggests a relatively
strict view of the Establishment Clause, it also hints at the importance
of neutral treatment for public and private schools and the value of
secular content restrictions.
B. Problems in Applying Lemon and the Emergence of the Endorsement
and Coercion Tests
Shortly after Nyquist, the Court addressed a state statute that pro-
vided both textbook loans and loans for instructional material and
equipment to nonpublic schools in Meek v. Pittenger.89 The Court
found that state loans for instructional material and equipment to
"pervasively sectarian" schools were unconstitutional. 90 According to
the Court, "pervasively sectarian" institutions are those organizations
whose "secular activities cannot be separated from its sectarian
ones."9 1 The Meek Court had to reconcile its decision to reject loans
of instructional material with the Allen decision, which permitted text-
book loans. As a result, the Meek Court upheld the statute's textbook
loans while simultaneously denying the loans for other instructional
material. 92 In so doing, the Court created an unusual distinction be-
tween a constitutional loan of textbooks to "pervasively sectarian"
schools and an unconstitutional loan of other instructional material to
these same schools.
9 3
One possible explanation for the Court's distinction was that the
textbooks were loaned to students, while the instructional material
was given directly to the private schools.94 This distinction, however,
fell apart when the Court rejected a law that provided instructional
equipment to families, and not schools, in Wolman v. Walter.95 In Wol-
man, the Court continued to treat instructional material differently
89 421 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1975). The instructional material included maps,
charts, periodicals, photographs, films, sound recordings, projection equipment, and
laboratory equipment. Id. at 354-55.
90 Id. at 366.
91 Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976).
92 Meek, 421 U.S. at 362, 372-73.
93 David S. Petron, Note, Finding Direction in Indirection: The Direct/Indirect Aid Dis-
tinction in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 1233, 1240-42
(2000).
94 Id. at 1240-41.
95 433 U.S. 229, 251, 255 (1977); see also Petron, supra note 93, at 1241 (explain-
ing that in Wolman the Court rejected the distinction between direct aid to private
schools and indirect aid to students).
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than textbooks, regardless of whether the instructional-material loans
were given to individual families or directly to the schools.9 6 The con-
fusing distinction between textbooks and other instructional material
suggests that the Court struggled to apply the Lemon test in these
cases.
These struggles continued as individual Justices adopted different
methods for applying the Lemon test and interpreting the Establish-
ment Clause. In Lynch v. Donnelly,97 Justice O'Connor wrote "sepa-
rately to suggest a clarification of [the Court's] Establishment Clause
doctrine."9 8 In Lynch, the Court found that the Establishment Clause
was not violated when a municipality displayed "a creche, or Nativity
scene, in its annual Christmas display."99 The Lynch Court further
moved away from Jefferson's "wall" metaphor, as it explained that "the
metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical
aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and
state." 10 0 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor suggested that when
interpreting the Establishment Clause, the Court should focus on
whether government action endorses religion:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making ad-
herence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in
the political community. Government can run afoul of that prohibi-
tion in two main ways. One is excessive entanglement with religious
institutions .... The second and more direct infringement is gov-
ernment endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the oppo-
site message .... Focusing on institutional entanglement and on
endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an
analytical device.' 0 '
Justice O'Connor argued that the Court should apply an endorse-
ment test to both the "purpose" and "effects" prongs of its Lemon anal-
ysis. 10 2 She first explained that "[t]he proper inquiry under the
purpose prong of Lemon . . . is whether the government intends to
convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion."10 3
Turning to the "effects" prong, Justice O'Connor similarly argued that
96 Wolman, 433 U.S. at 238, 250-51.
97 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
98 Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99 Id. at 670-71; see also id. at 687.
100 Id. at 673.
101 Id. at 687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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"[w] hat is crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of
communicating a message of government endorsement or
disapproval.
°1 0 4
Justice O'Connor clarified the endorsement test in her concur-
ring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree.10 5 In Wallace, she recognized that
applying "the Lemon test has proved problematic" and she again advo-
cated using the endorsement inquiry as a way to improve the Court's
Lemon analysis.10 6 Justice O'Connor explained that "[lt]he relevant is-
sue" under her test "is whether an objective observer, acquainted with
the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would
perceive [the challenged practice] as a state endorsement" of relig-
ion.10 7 Therefore, Justice O'Connor's endorsement test "is based on
an informed and reasonable observer's perception of the [govern-
ment] practice."'01 8 The Court has adopted Justice O'Connor's en-
dorsement test and relied on her Lynch concurrence in several
Establishment Clause cases. 109 For instance, in County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union, a majority of the Court explained: "In
recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether the
challenged governmental practice has the purpose or effect of 'en-
dorsing' religion, a concern that has long had a place in our Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence.""10
Justice Kennedy, however, has strongly rejected the endorsement
test and suggested that the Court apply a different approach when
interpreting the Establishment Clause. Writing separately in County of
Allegheny, Justice Kennedy argued that the endorsement test was "a
recent, and . . . most unwelcome, addition to [the Court's] tangled
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.""' He further explained that
104 Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
105 472 U.S. 38, 67-84 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106 Id. at 68-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107 Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108 Lisa Langendorfer, Comment, Establishing a Pattern: An Analysis of the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 705, 711 (1999).
109 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 654-55 (2002) (using lan-
guage from Justice O'Connor's endorsement test to uphold a school voucher pro-
gram); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(using the endorsement test to strike down a Texas statute that exempted religious
periodicals from sales tax); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60-61 (applying Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test in finding that a moment of silence for meditation or voluntary
prayer is unconstitutional); see also Langendorfer, supra note 108, at 712-14 (discuss-
ing the Supreme Court cases that have used Justice O'Connor's endorsement test).
110 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.
111 Id. at 668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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Justice O'Connor's test was "flawed in its fundamentals and unwork-
able in practice."' 1 2 Instead, Justice Kennedy suggested a narrower
view of what constitutes establishment of religion:
[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding
hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in
such a degree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or relig-
ious faith, or tends to do so."
1 13
Under Justice Kennedy's coercion test, noncoercive action will only
violate the Establishment Clause when it is substantial: "Noncoercive
government action within the realm of flexible accommodation or
passive acknowledgment of existing symbols does not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause unless it benefits religion in a way more direct and
more substantial than practices that are accepted in our national
heritage.""14
Lemon represents one of the Court's first attempts to determine
when neutral support of religion crosses over to the unconstitutional
establishment of religion. However, the Lemon test proved to be diffi-
cult to apply and occasionally resulted in incoherent distinctions, like
the one between textbooks and instructional material. 1 5 Lemon con-
tinued to decay as some Justices advocated strikingly different ap-
proaches to applying the test, and at least one Justice, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, suggested that it should be abandoned altogether. 116
C. Bowen v. Kendrick: A Precursor to the Faith-Based Initiative?
In Bowen v. Kendrick,I" 7 the Court examined a faith-based social
welfare program similar to the one now sponsored by President Bush.
112 Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
113 Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
114 Id. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
115 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 238, 250-51 (1977).
116 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Lemon test "has no basis in the history of the [First A]mendment, is
difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results"). Several legal scholars have noted
that the Lemon test has faded in importance. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GER-
ALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 535 (2d ed. 2003) (recognizing that "the Court
has not formally renounced the Lemon test, but has relied on it less and less in recent
cases"); McConnell, supra note 53, at 685-86 (noting that "it is increasingly evident
that the Lemon test is largely irrelevant or indeterminate when applied to most serious
establishment issues").
117 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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In Bowen, the Court upheld "a federal grant program that provides
funding for services relating to adolescent sexuality and preg-
nancy."' 1 8 The Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) supplied federal
grants to public or nonprofit private organizations that provided such
services. 119 In upholding a facial challenge to. the law, the Court's
analysis again focused on the effects of the Act. The Court first ex-
plained that the Establishment Clause does not restrain the govern-
ment from using religious institutions to solve social problems:
"Nothing in our previous cases prevents Congress from ... recogniz-
ing the important part that religion or religious organizations may
play in resolving certain secular problems. ' 120 The Court argued that
it "has never held that religious institutions are disabled by the First
Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare
programs." 121 Like President Bush, the Bowen Court recognized "the
long history of cooperation and interdependency between govern-
ments and charitable or religious institutions." 1 22
However, the Court also noted that despite this long history, gov-
ernment funding can have the impermissible effect of advancing relig-
ion. 123 In Bowen, the Court did not find an improper effect because
the funds were provided neutrally and without reference to religion:
"The AFLA defines an 'eligible grant recipient' as a 'public or non-
profit private organization.' "124 The Court further explained that it
would not presume that "religiously affiliated AFLA grantees [were]
not capable of carrying out their functions under the AFLA in a law-
ful, secular manner."'125 In upholding the program, the Court
demonstrated that it would not presume that religious recipients
would use the aid on religious activities.
Although Bowen appears to be definitive case law supporting the
faith-based plan, the decision does not guarantee the constitutionality
of modern faith-based initiatives.' 26 The Court only held that the
AFLA did not on its face violate the Establishment Clause. 127 The pos-
sibility remained open that an as applied challenge to the Act would
118 Id. at 593.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 607.
121 Id. at 609.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 608.
125 Id. at 612.
126 Lin et al., supra note 15, at 199-200.
127 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593.
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prevail.128 While Bowen demonstrates that a facial challenge to the
faith-based initiative would likely fail, it does not reveal how an as ap-
plied challenge would be decided. 129 The dearth of other relevant
case law on government funding for faith-based social welfare groups
and the limited reach of the Bowen holding has compelled legal com-
mentators to turn to religious school aid cases for "further gui-
dance."130 These cases represent the "closest analogy" as to how the
Court would treat the faith-based plan.
1 31
D. The "Closest Analogy ": Government Aid to Religious Schools
Although the Court's early decisions recognize that the Establish-
ment Clause permitted some interaction between church and state,
they nonetheless reveal that the Court was hesitant to permit federal
funding of religious institutions. However, starting with Mueller v. Al-
/en132 in 1983, and continuing with a string of religious school aid
cases, the Court began to demonstrate a more accepting view of gov-
ernment aid to religion.
In Mueller, the Court upheld a Minnesota law that permitted tax-
paying families with children in public, private, or religious schools to
deduct the expenses for "tuition, textbooks, and transportation" when
"computing their state income tax."' 33 In upholding the law, the
Court relied on two main factors that would become benchmark con-
siderations for indirect aid cases.134 First, the Court distinguished its
decision from Nyquist by emphasizing that the state assistance was pro-
vided neutrally to "all parents," regardless of whether the children at-
tended public schools, nonreligious private schools, or religious
private schools.13 5 The Court found that such neutral aid to "a broad
spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Es-
128 Lin et al., supra note 15, at 198-200.
129 Id. at 200.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
133 Id. at 388-91.
134 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653-55 (2002) (upholding a
school voucher program because the program fulfilled the benchmarks of neutrality
and private choice); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3, 9-10 (1993)
(applying the same two factors in permitting a school district to pay for a sign-lan-
guage interpreter to assist a disabled student attending a religious school); Witters v.
Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 482, 487-88 (1986) (relying on
neutrality and private choice in upholding disability aid provided to a blind person
studying to become a minister at a Christian college).
135 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397-98.
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tablishment Clause."' 36 Second, the Court also stressed that the state
aid only reaches religious schools "as a result of numerous private
choices of individual parents."137 The Court upheld the law even
though the majority of families that benefited from the aid had chil-
dren in religious schools. 13 8 In determining constitutionality, the
Court found that the actual ratio of religious school students to non-
religious school students was not dispositive.139 The Court explained
that it would be "loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality
of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which
various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law."
140
Following Mueller, the Court continued to demonstrate the im-
portance of neutrality and private choice in indirect school aid cases.
In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,141 the Court
relied on neutrality and private choice to uphold disability aid pro-
vided to a blind person who was studying to become a minister at a
private Chrisiian college. 142 The Court noted that the government
aid was provided neutrally to a class of recipients that are not defined
by religion, 143 and that the law created "no financial incentive[s]" to
direct the aid to religious schools. 144 Rather, the funding "ultimately
flows to religious institutions... only as a result of the genuinely inde-
pendent and private choices of aid recipients."
145
Likewise, the Court produced a similar outcome in Zobrest v. Cata-
lina Foothills School District.146 Here, the Court permitted a school dis-
trict to pay for a sign-language interpreter to assist a disabled student
attending a religious school. 147 The government program "dis-
tribute[d] benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'disabled'
under the IDEA, without regard" to whether the child attends a pub-
lic, private, or religious school. 148 The government aid fulfilled Muel-
ler's second benchmark as well, because the program was not "skewed
towards religion" and an "interpreter [would] be present in a secta-
136 Id. at 398-99.
137 Id. at 399.
138 Id. at 400-01.
139 Id. at 401.
140 Id.
141 474 U.S. 481 (1985).
142 Id. at 482, 487-88.
143 Id. at 488.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 487.
146 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
147 Id. at 3.
148 Id. at 10.
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rian school only as a result of the private decision of individual
parents. "149
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest reveal that the Court has become
more receptive to government funding of religious institutions. Per-
haps more importantly, the cases demonstrate that government aid to
religious institutions will not violate the Establishment Clause when
the aid is neutrally provided without reference to religion, and when
it only reaches the religious institutions through the private choices of
individual families. These cases adopted a view of the Establishment
Clause that paved the way for the Court to uphold the use of school
vouchers in Zelman.
E. Zelman and the Court's Current Case Law
In Agostini v. Felton,150 the Court freely admitted that its approach
to the Establishment Clause had "significant[ly] change [d]" over the
years.151 In light of these changes, the Court decided to redefine its
weakened Lemon test. In reworking the test, the Court decided to fo-
cus on the "purpose" and "effects" prongs, and to place the entangle-
ment inquiry into a broader "effects" category.1 52 The Agostini Court
maintained Lemon's "purpose" prong and explained that it will con-
tinue to inquire whether "the government acted with the purpose of
advancing or inhibiting religion."'153 The Court, however, named
three criteria to fit within the expanded "effects" inquiry: the govern-
ment aid must not (1) result in "governmental indoctrination;" (2)
"define its recipients by reference to religion;" nor (3) create an "ex-
cessive entanglement" with religion.1 54
In Agostini, the Court considered whether New York City, pursu-
ant to a congressionally mandated program, could send "public
school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education
to disadvantaged children."' 55 Through Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, Congress permitted federal funds to be dis-
tributed to a local educational agency (LEA). 156 The LEAs would use
the funds to provide remedial education to all disadvantaged chil-
149 Id.
150 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
151 Id. at 235-37 (alteration in original) (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
CountyJail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992)).
152 Id. at 232-33.
153 Id. at 222-23.
154 Id. at 234.
155 Id. at 208-09.
156 Id. at 209.
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dren, regardless of where they attended school. 157 The Board of Edu-
cation of the City of New York struggled with how to provide the Title
I services to private school students, many of whom were attending
religious schools. 158 New York implemented a plan where public
school teachers would provide the services to eligible students on pri-
vate school premises during school hours.1 59 As a result, public
school teachers would often be teaching in private schools with relig-
ious affiliations. 160 The Court had evaluated this plan twelve years ear-
lier and found that it violated the Establishment Clause in Aguilar v.
Felton.
16 1
The Agostini Court noted several reasons for now upholding the
once-rejected program. First, the Court explained that it would no
longer presume that public school teachers would promote religion
simply because they "enter[ ] a parochial school classroom."'162 Sec-
ond, the Court no longer believed that "all government aid that di-
rectly assists the educational function of religious schools is
invalid."'163 Unlike Witters and Zobrest, where the aid was first distrib-
uted to individual families, the students under this program did not
apply for the aid. 164 The Court, however, explained that it "fail[ed] to
see how providing Tide I services directly to eligible students results in
a greater financing of religious indoctrination simply because those
students are not first required to submit a formal application.' 65 Fi-
nally, the Court upheld the program because the services are provided
neutrally and the aid to religious schools is subject to several
safeguards.
166
Although Justice O'Connor wrote the Agostini opinion that rede-
fined the Lemon test, she only concurred in the Court's application of
the new test in Mitchell v. Helms.167 In the plurality opinion, the Court
overturned its decisions in Meek and Wolman by upholding a per-cap-
ita-aid program that provided instructional material, such as com-
puters, to both public and private schools based on the number of
157 Id.
158 Id. at 210.
159 Id. at 210-11. Previous plans to transport the children to public schools for
after-school instruction failed because attendance was poor, and both the teachers
and the children were tired. Id. at 210.
160 Id. at 211.
161 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985).
162 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226.
163 Id. at 225.
164 Id. at 228-29.
165 Id. at 229.
166 Id. at 232-35.
167 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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students in the schools. 168 The plurality opinion clearly focused its
decision to uphold the law on a neutrality argument. The plurality
explained that when the "religious, irreligious, and areligious are all
alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude" that relig-
ious indoctrination has occurred. 169 The plurality also held that the
per-capita-aid program was the equivalent to a program of true private
choice. 70 The plurality even went so far as to permit government aid
to be diverted to religious uses, as long as the content of the aid was
not "impermissibly religious."1 7'
The Mitchell plurality did not entirely clarify how the post-Agostini
Court would apply its modified Lemon test to Establishment Clause
cases. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,172 the majority opinion more
clearly differentiated between the types of Establishment Clause cases
and demonstrated how the Court would treat those cases. The Court
first recognized that the voucher law easily fulfilled the "purpose"
prong of the Agostini-Lemon test: "There is no dispute that the pro-
gram challenged here was enacted for the valid secular purpose of
providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably
failing public school system." 173 Therefore, similar to the Court's
other school aid cases, its analysis of the Ohio voucher law turned
primarily on the "effects" prong of the test.174
In deciding whether the Ohio voucher law has the unconstitu-
tional effect of advancing religion, the Court differentiated between
two strains in its case law: "To answer [the effects] question, our deci-
sions have drawn a consistent distinction between government pro-
grams that provide aid directly to religious schools, and programs of
true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools
only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private
individuals."'175 For the direct aid cases, the Court mentioned Mitchell
168 Id. at 801 (plurality opinion).
169 Id. at 809 (plurality opinion).
170 Id. at 810-14, 829-31 (plurality opinion). However, Justice O'Connor's con-
currence distinguishes between per-capita-aid programs and those that are routed
first to individuals who then decide where to spend the aid. Id. at 842-44 (O'Connor,
J., concurring); see also infra Part IV (analyzing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Mitchell).
171 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820-25 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor also dis-
agrees with the plurality's position on the divertibility of government aid. Id. at
840-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
172 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
173 Id. at 649.
174 Id.
175 Id. (citations omitted).
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and Agostini.1 76 On the other hand, Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest were
named as examples of indirect or private choice cases. 17 7 Given this
division, Zelman clearly fits within the category of private choice cases.
Like the statutes at issue in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, the Court up-
held the voucher law in Zelman because it fulfilled the two
benchmarks of neutrality and private choice. The Ohio statute was
"neutral in all respects toward religion," as the aid recipients were de-
fined by need and their presence in a failing school district.178 More-
over, the aid only reached religious schools after genuine and
independent private decisions by the families holding the vouchers.
1 79
In his dissent, Justice Souter criticized the majority opinion be-
cause school vouchers permit government aid to be used on religious
instruction.180 He explained that "[t] he money will ... pay for eligi-
ble students' instruction in not only secular subjects but in religion as
well, in schools that can fairly be characterized as founded to teach
religious doctrine and to imbue teaching in all subjects with a relig-
ious dimension."'I 8 1 However, the majority explained that the fear of
government endorsement of religion is lessened in private choice pro-
grams. Applying language from Justice O'Connor's endorsement test,
the Court explained:
[W]e have repeatedly recognized that no reasonable observer would
think a neutral program of private choice, where state aid reaches
religious schools solely as a result of the numerous independent de-
cisions of private individuals, carries with it the imprimatur of gov-
ernment endorsement .... Any objective observer familiar with the
full history and context of the Ohio program would reasonably view
it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor children in
failed schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling in
general.
182
When private decisions determine where to direct the aid, "[t] he inci-
dental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorse-
ment of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the
individual recipient, not to the government." 183 Thus, indirect aid




178 Id. at 653.
179 Id. at 653-55.
180 Id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting).
181 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 654-55.
183 Id. at 652.
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Justice Souter questioned whether recipients actually had a genu-
ine choice on where to use the vouchers because most of the private
schools participating in the program were religious. 18 4 He also noted
that "96.6% of all voucher recipients go to religious schools."18 5 Jus-
tice Souter argued that "[t] here is... no way to interpret the 96.6% of
current voucher money going to religious schools as reflecting a free
and genuine choice by families that apply for vouchers."'8 6 The ma-
jority refuted the claim that families lacked educational choices:
"[Schoolchildren] may remain in public school as before, remain in
public school with publicly funded tutoring aid, obtain a scholarship
and choose a religious school, obtain a scholarship and choose a non-
religious private school, enroll in a community school, or enroll in a
magnet school.' 8 7 The majority further explained that the mere fact
that most families who use the vouchers direct the aid toward religious
schools does not affect the constitutionality of the law: "The constitu-
tionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on
whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most pri-
vate schools are run by religious organizations, or most recipients
choose to use the aid at a religious school."18 The majority's position
is consistent with the Court's earlier decisions. As mentioned above,
the Mueller Court held that the mere fact that more religious school
students benefited from an aid program would not render it
unconstitutional. 189
Although Zelman had been predicted to be "the most important
church-state case in the last half century,"' 90 it conforms to several of
the Court's earlier decisions and in many ways does not represent a
"dramatic break from the past."' 91 In distinguishing between the two
categories of Establishment Clause cases, the Court suggested that fu-
ture church-state debates will turn on the category under which the
aid program falls.
III. THE IMPACT ON INDIRECTLY FUNDED PROGRAMS
Both direct and indirect faith-based programs have the secular
purpose of improving the quality and effectiveness of social services.
184 .Id. at 703 (Souter, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 707 (SouterJ., dissenting).
187 Id. at 655.
188 Id. at 658.
189 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983).
190 David G. Savage, Supreme Court Takes Voucher Case, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2001, at
A28, available at 2001 WL 2521027.
191 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Therefore, in judging the constitutionality of the faith-based plan, the
Supreme Court will likely, as in Zelman, focus on the "effects" prong of
the Agostini-Lemon test. As mentioned earlier, the obvious implication
from Zelman is that the Court will not find an impermissible effect
when faith-based groups are funded in the form of vouchers.
Voucher-style funding for religious social service groups would
similarly fit within the second category of Establishment Clause cases
because such funding fulfills the benchmarks of neutrality and private
choice. Like Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, and now Zelman, such a program
could neutrally issue vouchers to aid beneficiaries. The aid recipients
would be defined by neutral criteria, such as need, and not by relig-
ion. The aid recipients would then make a private decision whether or
not to redeem their vouchers at a religious or nonreligious social ser-
vice group. As long as the program provides recipients with a genuine
opportunity to redeem the vouchers at either a religious or secular
organization, it will not trample on the Establishment Clause. Such a
program would not have the unconstitutional effect of advancing re-
ligion because the government aid is provided neutrally, and any aid
that flows to religious social welfare groups would do so only as a re-
sult of the "independent decisions of private individuals."'192
Federal appellate courts have already begun to use the reasoning
in Zelman to uphold the constitutionality of religious programs that
receive voucher-style funding. In Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.
v. McCallum,193 the Seventh Circuit found that state correctional au-
thorities are permitted to fund Faith Works, a halfway house that in-
corporates religion in its treatment. 194 If convicted criminals are out
on parole and violate the terms of their parole, the parole officers can
recommend a specific halfway house for the offender. 195 The court
found that while the state cannot require offenders to attend Faith
Works, the parole officers can recommend it.196 The court empha-
sized that the choice "is private" because "it is the offender's choice"
whether or not to choose Faith Works.1 97 In using the Zelman ratio-
nale, the court upheld the voucher-style funding: "The state in effect
gives eligible offenders 'vouchers' that they can use to purchase a
place in a halfway house, whether the halfway house is 'parochial' or
secular." 98
192 Id. at 655.
193 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003).
194 Id. at 882.
195 Id. at 881.
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As demonstrated by the Seventh Circuit, programs that incorpo-
rate voucher-style funding and ensure true private choice will be up-
held. According to the Zelman decision, the Supreme Court's
commitment to uphold programs of true private choice "has re-
mained consistent and unbroken." 199 The current case law reveals
that the Court will similarly uphold faith-based initiatives that provide
private choice through vouchers. Although such an implication ap-
pears to be a victory for President Bush's faith-based plan, this victory
has been qualified. Some members of the legal community have ar-
gued that under Mitchell and Zelman the current Court would only
uphold the faith-based plan if it received indirect or voucher-style
funding.200 According to these arguments, directly funded religious
social service groups would offend the Establishment Clause.
20 1
IV. THE IMPACT ON DIRECTLY FUNDED PROGRAMS
The legal future of directly funded faith-based initiatives will likely
depend on the vote of one Justice. The current Court is strictly di-
vided on its interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Justice Ken-
nedy's coercion test reveals that he adopts an accommodationist view
because, in general, he will only find an Establishment Clause viola-
tion when the government coerces its citizens to support religion or
when noncoercive action substantially benefits religion. 20 2 Justice
Kennedy has also explained that " [r] ather than requiring government
to avoid any action that acknowledges or aids religion, the Establish-
ment Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing and
accommodating the central role religion plays in our society." 20 3 Jus-
tices Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist have also adopted
an accommodationist position as they have demonstrated a tendency
to uphold government aid to religious groups when the aid is pro-
vided neutrally.20 4 On the other hand, Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Ste-
199 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002).
200 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
201 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
202 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-63 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
203 Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
204 Cole, supra note 27, at 562. In Mitchell, Justices Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy, and
ChiefJustice Rehnquist explained that they have "consistently turned to the principle
of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons
without regard to their religion." Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plural-
ity opinion). The tendency of these Justices to permit federal funding of religious
institutions is evident in other cases as well. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 643-63 (hold-
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vens, and occasionally Justice Breyer have rejected most government
aid for religious activities. 20 5 Although Justice Breyer joined Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Mitchell to uphold the instructional mate-
rial loans, his dissent in Zelman represented a move back to the separa-
tionist block of Justices.
20 6
The critical "swing" vote belongs to Justice O'Connor.2 0 7 Al-
though Justice O'Connor often aligns with the accommodationist
block, her endorsement test reveals that she will be more skeptical of
government aid to religious groups. In fact, Justice Kennedy has de-
scribed the endorsement test as "reflect[ing] an unjustified hostility
toward religion." 20 8 Justice O'Connor has demonstrated that her Es-
tablishment Clause analysis will require more than the narrower coer-
cion test:
An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only "coercive"
practices or overt efforts at government proselytization, but fails to
take account of the numerous more subtle ways that government
can show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of dis-
approval to others, would not, in my view, adequately protect the
ing that families can use school vouchers on religious schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 208-40 (1997) (holding that public school teachers can teach disadvantaged
children in religious schools).
205 Cole, supra note 27, at 562. These Justices have often dissented in cases where
religious groups receive federal aid. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686-717 (Souter,
Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (permitting families to use school vouch-
ers on religious schools); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867-913 (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg,
JJ., dissenting) (loaning computers and other instructional material to religious
schools); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 255-60 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissent-
ing) (providing remedial education for students in religious schools).
206 See Charles Fried, Comment, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case,
116 HARV. L. REv. 163, 183-85 (2002) (explaining thatJustice Breyer "dipped his toe
in accommodationist waters in Mitchell, [but] he drew back from taking a plunge ...
in Zelman"); see also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 717-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
against the constitutionality of the school voucher program); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at
836-67 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring) (joining Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence, Justice Breyer found that the instructional material loans were constitutional).
207 See e.g., Esbeck, supra note 56, at 33 (explaining that Justice O'Connor is the
swing vote" in direct aid cases); Savage, supra note 36, at 29 (correctly predicting that
Justice O'Connor's vote would be the tiebreaker in the Zelman decision because her
"views are decisive in nearly all the religion cases"); Langendorfer, supra note 108, at
725 (suggesting that 'Justice O'Connor's vote will most likely remain the swing vote"
in Establishment Clause debates); Lin et al., supra note 15, at 203 (referring to Justice
O'Connor as the "swing Justice").
208 County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
2003]
416 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:1
religious liberty or respect the religious diversity of the members of
our pluralistic political community.
20 9
In addition, her highly critical concurrence of the plurality's opinion
in Mitchell suggests that she will demand more of a direct aid program
than the four accommodationist Justices. 210 Therefore, Justice
O'Connor's vote is critical in predicting how the current Court would
treat the constitutionality of a directly funded faith-based program.
2 1 1
A. Justice O'Connor and Direct Government Aid
In light of the Court's emphasis on private choice in Zelman, it
has been suggested that the faith-based plan will be constitutional "so
long as the money flows through individuals, not directly to religious
groups."212 Although Zelman suggests the constitutionality of an indi-
rectly funded program, it does not require such funding to be indirect.
As explained above, the Court has emphasized two different strains in
its Establishment Clause case law and has demonstrated that Zelman
falls within the private choice category. Hence, Zelman should only be
used to support other indirect aid or private choice programs. Using
Zelman to suggest how the Court would treat a direct aid program
would be overreaching the boundaries of the decision. Rather, the
Court will focus on the first category of Establishment Clause cases,
namely the direct aid cases, when determining the constitutionality of
a directly funded faith-based program.
The Zelman Court named Mitchell and Agostini as examples of di-
rect aid cases. 2 13 Several legal commentators have argued thatJustice
O'Connor's concurrence in Mitchell demonstrates that she would only
uphold an indirect faith-based program that "route [s] aid directly to
individuals involved in the program, perhaps in the form of vouch-
ers."'2 14 These commentators suggest that direct faith-based initiatives
would likely "garner the support of only four Justices," because Justice
O'Connor would "require the aid [to] flow directly to individuals who
would then make a choice about where to direct their money."
2 15
209 Id. at 627-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
210 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
211 Michelman, supra note 6, at 487.
212 Savage, supra note 15, at 34.
213 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649.
214 Lin et al., supra note 15, at 204-05; see also Michelman, supra note 6, at 487-92
(arguing that Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Mitchell reveals that she would up-
hold indirectly funded faith-based initiatives but reject a directly funded program).
215 Lin et al., supra note 15, at 204-05 (emphasis added); see also Michelman,
supra note 6, at 487-92 (arguing thatJustice O'Connor would "find an impermissible
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Some of Justice O'Connor's language in her Mitchell concurrence
seems to support this view. For instance, Justice O'Connor noted the
Court's "continued recognition of the special dangers associated with
direct money grants to religious institutions. '2 1 6 She later explained
that "the most important reason for according special treatment to
direct money grants is that th [is] form of aid falls precariously close to
the original object of the Establishment Clause's prohibition. '" 217 The
third strike against direct aid appeared later in the same paragraph
where the Justice again recognized "the constitutionally suspect status
of direct cash aid."2
18
In addition, Justice O'Connor rebuked the Mitchell plurality for
overemphasizing the importance of neutrality and for "com [ing] close
to assigning that factor singular importance in the future adjudication
of Establishment Clause challenges. '" 219 Justice O'Connor feared that
the plurality had upheld the loans of instructional material solely be-
cause the aid was provided neutrally to both religious and secular
schools. 220 She explained that "we have never held that a govern-
ment-aid program passes constitutional muster solely because of the
neutral criteria it employs as a basis for distributing aid."221 While
Justice O'Connor recognized that "neutrality is important," she em-
phasized that "it is by no means the only 'axiom in the history and
precedent of the Establishment Clause."' 222
Moreover, Justice O'Connor explained that private choice pro-
grams, which route funds first to individuals, eliminate some of the
"dangers" of direct aid. 223 In her Mitchell concurrence, she criticized
the plurality for "treat[ing] a per-capita-aid program the same as the
true private-choice programs considered in Witters and Zobrest."224
She argued that a direct per-capita-aid program comes much closer to
government endorsement of religion:
endorsement of religion" in directly funded faith-based initiatives); Savage, supra note
15, at 34 (explaining thatJustice O'Connor "has frowned on direct government aid to
religious institutions, but not to vouchers or tax credits that go to parents").
216 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 855 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
217 Id. at 856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
218 Id. (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
219 Id. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
220 Id. at 837-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
221 Id. at 839 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
222 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenberg v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
223 Id. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenberg, 515 U.S. at 842) (ci-
tation omitted).
224 Id. at 842 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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In terms of public perception, a government program of direct aid
to religious schools based on the number of students attending
each school differs meaningfully from the government distributing
aid directly to individual students who, in turn, decide to use the aid
at the same religious schools .... Because the religious indoctrina-
tion is supported by government assistance, the reasonable observer
would naturally perceive the [per-capita-]aid program as government
support for the advancement of religion. That the amount of aid
received by the school is based on the school's enrollment does not
separate the government from the endorsement of the religious
message.
22 5
Justice O'Connor contrasted the per-capita-aid program with a private
choice program where the "endorsement of the religious message is
reasonably attributed to the individuals who select the path of the
aid '." 2 26 Combining Justice O'Connor's concerns with direct aid, her
requirement for additional factors other than just neutrality, and her
positive view of private choice programs, some commentators have as-
sumed that she would require private choice through indirect
funding.
22 7
Such an assumption, however, would misinterpret and limit the
Justice's position. While Justice O'Connor may find direct aid prob-
lematic, she does not find it per se unconstitutional. In order to under-
stand her position on direct aid programs, a proper analysis will focus
on her two stated reasons for writing separately in Mitchell. First, as
already mentioned, she wrote separately to emphasize that the Court
should rely on factors other than just neutrality in upholding aid pro-
grams. However, nowhere in the concurrence did Justice O'Connor
require the additional factor to be private choice. Although she recog-
nized that private choice programs have fewer problems than direct
aid programs, she did not imply that only private choice programs will
pass constitutional muster.
In Zelman, Justice O'Connor's concurrence demonstrated that an
inquiry into whether an aid program provides genuine private choice
is only required in indirect aid cases. In that case, Justice O'Connor
explained that when addressing the question of "how to apply the pri-
mary effects prong in indirect aid cases," and not when the aid is given
"directly to service providers," the Court will consider "whether bene-
ficiaries of indirect aid have a genuine [private] choice among relig-
225 Id. at 842-43 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
226 Id. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
227 See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
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ious and nonreligious organizations. '" 228 Here,Justice O'Connor went
to great lengths to demonstrate that the inquiry into private choice
was only necessary in indirect aid cases. In addition, both Agostini and
Mitchell dealt with aid programs that were not first routed to individu-
als, and neither Justice O'Connor nor the Court required private
choice in either case.
B. Justice O'Connor and the Divertibility of Government Funds
The second stated reason for why Justice O'Connor wrote sepa-
rately in Mitchell was that she disagreed with the plurality's opinion
regarding the divertibility of government aid. The plurality avoided
the divertibility problem by explicitly permitting government aid to be
diverted toward religious activities as long as the aid was neutrally pro-
vided and the content of the aid was secular.229 Justice O'Connor crit-
icized this approach.2 30 She explained that permitting diversion of
funds toward religious objectives in direct aid programs could reason-
ably be perceived as government endorsement of religion. 23 1
Justice O'Connor further noted that the plurality's position was
contrary to the Court's previous cases. 232 She recognized that the
Bowen Court remanded the case to determine "whether aid recipients
had used the government aid to support their religious objectives." 23 3
She went on to explain that "[t] he remand would have been unneces-
sary if, as the plurality contends, actual diversion were irrelevant
under the Establishment Clause."23 4 In addition, Justice O'Connor
explained that the plurality mistakenly relied on private choice cases,
like Witters and Zobrest, to support its view that actual diversion of
funds is permissible. 23 5 The diversion of funds is more acceptable in
private choice cases because the concern with government endorse-
ment is reduced when the aid reaches religious institutions as a result
of private decisions by individuals. 236
228 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (em-
phasis added).
229 Mitchell 530 U.S. at 820-25 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 912 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that "It]he plurality is candid in pointing out the extent of
actual diversion . . . and equally candid in saying it does not matter").
230 Id. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231 Id. at 842-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
232 Id. at 840-41 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
233 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
234 Id. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
235 Id. at 841-42 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
236 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Thus, Justice O'Connor strongly contrasted direct per-capita-aid
programs with indirect private choice programs to demonstrate the
dangers of permitting actual diversion when direct aid is involved.
237
Although she suggested that a "reasonable observer" would perceive a
per-capita-aid program as endorsing religion, she qualified her state-
ment.238 She explained that "if the religious school uses the aid to
inculcate religion in its students, it is reasonable to say that the gov-
ernment has communicated a message of endorsement. '" 239 However,
if the school does not divert the aid to religious inculcation, then the
reasonable observer would not perceive the government to have en-
dorsed religion. Under Justice O'Connor's view, direct per-capita-aid
programs can be constitutional when the program does not result in
actual and substantial diversion of government aid. Therefore, Justice
O'Connor does not require private choice in a government aid pro-
gram; however, when the program is direct and lacks private choice,
she will require that the aid is not substantially diverted to religious
uses.
Justice O'Connor, however, will permit the possibility of diversion.
In Mitchell, she explained that the Court should not "treat as constitu-
tionally suspect any form of secular aid that might conceivably be di-
verted to a religious use." 240 Rather, Justice O'Connor argued that
the Court will presume that religious institutions receiving govern-
ment aid will abide by secular content restrictions and will only use
the aid for secular purposes. For instance, in Agostini, where the ser-
vices were required to be "secular, neutral, and nonideological," she
explained that the Court "would presume that the instructors would
comply with the program's secular restrictions."241 Under Justice
O'Connor's test, the party challenging the direct aid program must
have hard evidence that the government aid was actually diverted to-
ward religious uses.242 She explained that in order "[t]o establish a
237 See id. at 842-43 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
238 Id. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
239 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
240 Id. at 855-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
241 Id. at 847 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 859 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (explaining that the Court has "been willing to assume that religious school
instructors can abide by [secular] restrictions when the aid consists of textbooks" and
that the Court will make the same assumption when the aid is instructional materials
and equipment); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997) (explaining that in
Zobrest the Court would not presume that a sign-language interpreter would inculcate
religion simply because she "enter[ed] a parochial school classroom").
242 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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First Amendment violation, plaintiffs must prove that the aid in ques-
tion actually is, or has been, used for religious purposes.
'243
However, in Mitchell, Justice Thomas's plurality opinion revealed
that there was evidence of actual diversion of funds toward religious
uses. 244 Justice O'Connor also recognized that some diversion had oc-
curred, but she found that the amount of diversion was de minimis: "I
know of no case in which we have declared an entire aid program
unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds solely because of
violations on [a] minuscule scale." 245 Justice Thomas suggested that
the evidence of diversion may have been more than de minimis:
There is persuasive evidence that ... audiovisual equipment [pro-
vided by the government] was used in a Catholic school's theology
department .... The diversion occurred over seven consecutive
school years, and the use of the equipment in the theology depart-
ment was massive in each of those years, outstripping in every year
use in other departments such as science, math, and foreign
language. 2
46
According to the dissent, some evidence also suggested that com-
puters were being diverted toward religious uses.
247
Justice O'Connor rejected the claims that substantial diversion of
federal funds occurred in Mitchell. She explained that the plurality
relied mainly on a chart showing that one religious school's theology
department used audio-visual equipment. 248 However, "the chart
d [id] not provide a breakdown identifying specific.., usage" of gov-
ernment funds.249 Justice O'Connor explained that without such evi-
dence the Court should "assume that the school used its own
equipment in the theology department and the [government] equip-
ment elsewhere. ' 250 She stated that, more importantly, the evidence
did not demonstrate that government aid "actually was diverted to re-
ligious education. '251 She also questioned whether the evidence re-
lied on by the dissent "even prove[d]" that computers were "diverted
to the school's religious mission."252 According to Justice O'Connor,
[t]o find that actual diversion will flourish [in this case], one must
243 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
244 Id. at 832-34 (plurality opinion).
245 Id. at 865 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
246 Id. at 833 n.17 (plurality opinion).
247 Id. at 910 (Souter, J., dissenting).
248 Id. at 864 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
249 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
250 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
251 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
252 Id. at 865 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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presume bad faith on the part of the religious school officials. '2 53 She
held that the Court should "presume that these school officials will act
in good faith" and will abide by content restrictions.
2 54
In general, given the suspect nature of direct aid, the amount of
acceptable diversion toward religious uses in these programs should
be strictly limited. Regardless of whether the aid in Mitchell was sub-
stantially diverted, a direct aid program should permit only the acci-
dental diversion of funds or truly de minimis diversion. While the
amount of diversion in Mitchell may have been too substantial, future
direct aid programs, such as direct faith-based initiatives, should en-
sure that any diversion is virtually nonexistent.
C. Justice O'Connor's Guidelines for Avoiding Government Endorsement
While Justice O'Connor has demonstrated that she will not re-
quire private choice in all aid programs, she has also indicated that
she will require some factors other than just neutrality when private
choice is absent. She has named the following factors, some of which
may overlap, to ensure that a government aid program is not "reason-
ably... viewed as an endorsement of religion":
[The] aid [should be] allocated on the basis of neutral, secular cri-
teria; the aid must be supplementary and cannot supplant non-Fed-
eral funds; no [government] funds ever reach the coffers of
religious schools; the aid must be secular; any evidence of actual
diversion is de minimis, and the program includes adequate
safeguards. 255
In Mitchell, Justice O'Connor relied on these factors to find that the
direct aid program did "not have the impermissible effect of advanc-
ing religion."256 Although she did not claim that these factors are
"constitutional requirements," they at least provide guidelines on how
both Justice O'Connor and the Court will treat aid programs when
private choice is missing.257
Because directly funded faith-based programs can meet each of
these factors, a majority of the Court would likely find them constitu-
tional. First, under the faith-based plan, government aid would be
neutrally allocated to both religious and nonreligious social service
providers based on secular criteria, such as their location within a de-
253 Id. at 863 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
254 Id. at 863-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
255 Id. at 867 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 210, 234-35
(referring to similar safeguards).
256 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
257 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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pressed area.258 Second, a faith-based program could easily stipulate
that government aid will only supplement non-federal funds. In
Mitchell, Justice O'Connor noted that the federal statute specifically
limited its funds to "supplement and not supplant funds from non-
Federal sources." 259 Faith-based organizations are not currently de-
pendent on only government funds, and there is no reason to believe
that government aid will completely supplant its funds from other
sources. Third, government aid could be kept separate from the cof-
fers of religious institutions. Justice O'Connor has explained that
such separation will be reinforced by the "supplantation restric-
tion."260 Fourth, the direct aid will have a secular content because it is
merely financial aid.
26 1
The fifth factor, which is to provide adequate safeguards, has
multiple elements. The aid programs in Mitchell and Agostini used sec-
ular content restrictions and monitoring as safeguards. Likewise, the
current faith-based plan imposes secular content restrictions by
prohibiting "direct Federal assistance to support inherently religious
activities, such as worship, religious instruction, or proselytization.
' 262
President Bush's Executive Order to install the OFBCI also explained
that religious organizations should be available for government funds
"so long as they achieve valid public purposes."263 As mentioned
above, Justice O'Connor and the Court presume that religious organi-
zations receiving government funds will be able to comply with these
secular content restrictions.
In addition, a faith-based program could easily set up a monitor-
ing system wherein religious organizations receive visits from supervi-
sors who strictly ensure that government funds are not being diverted
to religious uses. In Agostini, the Court found that "[t] here is no sug-
258 However, while faith-based initiatives are not supposed to favor religious service
providers, the President has publicly stated that he would "look first to faith-based
programs" when providing funds. Remarks on Signing Executive Orders with Respect
to Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, supra note 3, at 26. In order for faith-based
initiatives to be found constitutional, the government would have to avoid such
favoritism.
259 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 861 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
260 Id. at 848-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
261 Michelman, supra note 6, at 487.
262 Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141, 77,142 (Dec. 12, 2002); see also
Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (2001) (applying a similar
restriction on the uses of the federal aid).
263 Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499, 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001); see also Com-
mencement Address at the University of Notre Dame in Notre Dame, Indiana, supra
note 28, at 554 (explaining that the "[g]overnment should never fund the teaching of
faith, but it should support the good works of the faithful").
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gestion in the record ... that unannounced monthly visits of public
supervisors are insufficient to prevent or detect inculcation of religion
by public employees." 264 The Court further held that such a system
would not result in the excessive entanglement of government and
religion because it has upheld state programs that impose "far more
onerous burdens on religious institutions than the monitoring system
at issue here."2 6 5 Content restrictions and monitoring ensure that the
programs will not divert government funds to advance religion. Be-
cause directly funded faith-based programs can abide by these factors,
Justice O'Connor and a majority of the Supreme Court will likely up-
hold their constitutionality.
Some legal commentators argue that even with these safeguards,
any government aid provided directly to religious social service prov-
iders will inevitably advance the organizations' religious messages be-
cause they are "pervasively sectarian" institutions.266 These arguments
contend that the religious messages are too intertwined with the orga-
nizations' activities and cannot effectively be separated. 267 The Court,
however, has moved away from the "pervasively sectarian" test. Ac-
cording to the Mitchell plurality, the Court "took pains to emphasize
the narrowness of the 'pervasively sectarian' category" in Bowen.268
The Bowen Court found that "it is not enough to show that the recipi-
ent of a challenged grant is affiliated with a religious institution or
that it is 'religiously inspired.' " 269 In fact, the Court has only specifi-
cally named religious schools as being "pervasively sectarian" institu-
tions.270 In Agostini, the Court continued to move away from this test
as it upheld aid to religious schools when the program contained the
above safeguards. 2
71
In response, commentators argue that faith-based initiatives
could provide aid to churches, which would be even "more pervasively
sectarian than parochial schools because indoctrination is the sole
264 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997); see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 863-64
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that annual monitoring visits are sufficient and
presuming that religious school officials will act in good faith when reporting to
supervisors).
265 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
266 See Michelman, supra note 6, at 488-89; Peters, supra note 9, at 1202-03.
267 See Michelman, supra note 6, at 488-89; Peters, supra note 9, at 1202-03.
268 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826-27 (plurality opinion) (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick,
487 U.S. 589, 620-21 (1988)).
269 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 621.
270 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29 (plurality opinion); see also Michelman, supra note
6, at 489 (noting that "church-affiliated primary and secondary schools are the only
institutions that the Court has explicitly recognized as pervasively sectarian").
271 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997).
[VOL- 79:1a
RESURRECTING THE FAITH-BASED PLAN
purpose of most churches while schools have the additional function
of education. '" 272 However, any churches eligible for funds under the
faith-based plan would be required to have the "additional function"
of providing "valid public purposes," such as overcoming poverty and
treating addiction. 273 Under the above guidelines, these churches
would also be required to refrain from diverting the federal funds to-
ward religious activities or worship.
Furthermore, the Mitchell plurality officially abandoned the "per-
vasively sectarian" test. The accommodationist block of Justices ex-
plained that "the religious nature of a recipient should not matter to
the constitutional analysis, so long as the recipient adequately furthers
the government's secular purpose."274 Since faith-based initiatives fur-
ther a legitimate secular purpose, the plurality will not "reserve special
hostility for those who take their religion seriously, [or] who think
that their religion should affect the whole of their lives." 275 The plu-
rality explained that when the term "pervasively sectarian" was coined,
it "could be applied almost exclusively to Catholic parochial
schools."276 The four Justices held that "nothing in the Establishment
Clause requires the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools" and
that the "doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now."
2 7 7
Although Justice O'Connor did notjoin the Mitchell plurality, her
views on this issue are similar. In Agostini, Justice O'Connor wrote the
opinion that permitted aid to "pervasively sectarian" schools278 and, in
her Mitchell concurrence, she rejected the presumption that a relig-
ious school would necessarily inculcate religion.2 79 She explained in
Mitchell that a "presumption of indoctrination, because it constitutes
an absolute bar to the aid in question regardless of the religious
school's ability to separate that aid from its religious mission, consti-
tutes a 'flat rule, smacking of antiquated notions of "taint," [that]
would indeed exalt form over substance.' 2 0  Therefore, Justice
O'Connor demonstrated that she believes even religious, or "perva-
sively sectarian," schools can separate the government aid "from
[their] religious mission." She would similarly presume that religious
272 Peters, supra note 9, at 1203.
273 Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499, 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
274 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion).
275 Id. at 827-28 (plurality opinion).
276 Id. at 828-29 (plurality opinion).
277 Id. at 829 (plurality opinion).
278 SeeAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997).
279 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
280 Id. at 858 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993)).
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social service providers would not necessarily inculcate religion.
Hence, the "pervasively sectarian" test should not present any prob-
lem to the constitutionality of the faith-based plan.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision to uphold school vouchers in Zelman has
important implications for the future of President Bush's faith-based
plan. The case demonstrates that when a faith-based program is indi-
rectly funded through the use of vouchers, the Court will treat it as
falling within the private choice category of its Establishment Clause
case law. The Court will uphold such a program as long as govern-
ment aid meets the neutrality and private choice requirements. Indi-
rect government aid only promotes religious activities because
individuals make private decisions to redeem their vouchers at relig-
ious institutions. 2 81 Under such circumstances, the reasonable ob-
server would infer that the individuals, and not the government, have
endorsed the religious message.2 82 Therefore, when faith-based pro-
grams are funded through vouchers, Justice O'Connor and a majority
of the Court will be less concerned that a religious organization may
be using the government aid to promote a religious message. 283 For
example, the voucher program that the Court upheld in Zelman pro-
vided indirect aid to religious schools without any secular content re-
strictions on how the aid was to be used.28 4
Although the element of private choice removes several constitu-
tional obstacles, it is not required in a government aid program.
When private choice is absent from an aid program, the Court will
generally be more concerned with how the government aid is used. If
a direct aid program is neutral to religion, the four accommodationist
Justices would likely uphold it even though the aid is substantially di-
verted to religious uses. 28 5 However, to gain the support of a fifth
Justice, namelyJustice O'Connor, a direct aid program must fulfill ad-
ditional safeguards to ensure that federal funds are not used to pro-
mote a religious message.
Justice O'Connor has demonstrated that it is wrong for the Court
to presume that religious organizations are incapable of adhering to
281 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652-55 (2002).
282 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
283 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652-55; Mitchel4 530 U.S. at 843 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
284 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
285 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820-25 (plurality opinion).
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secular content restrictions and other safeguards.28 6  Justice
O'Connor will not require religious social service providers receiving
direct aid to stop performing religious activities. She will require,
however, that government funds be used for secular purposes. Unlike
the accommodationist Justices, Justice O'Connor requires that the
amount of diversion of federal funds toward religious uses be de
minimis. 287 The Mitchell plurality called into question what consti-
tuted permissible diversion of funds under Justice O'Connor's analy-
sis.288 To avoid the appearance of impropriety or endorsement,
directly funded faith-based initiatives, and other direct aid programs,
should strictly regulate the diversion of funds and only permit acci-
dental or extremely limited diversion. Thus, a majority of the Court
will uphold directly funded faith-based initiatives as long as the proper
safeguards are in place and the program does not result in the diver-
sion of aid toward religious uses.
Zelman did not in itself resolve all of the constitutional concerns
surrounding the faith-based plan. However, developments in the Su-
preme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence have paved the
way for it to uphold either an indirect or direct faith-based program.
Although a directly funded program will be subject to more stringent
confines, the Court will likely find it constitutional. Recent Supreme
Court cases, such as Zelman and Mitchell, suggest that Congress did not
need to remove religious provisions from the CARE bill. Therefore,
despite the legislative and political setbacks, proponents of the faith-
based plan should be reassured by these Establishment Clause cases
and should be confident in the constitutionality of the plan.
286 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
287 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 865 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
288 Id. at 832-34 (plurality opinion).
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